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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The events that unfolded during the summer of 2013 with respect 
to Lake Okeechobee and the surrounding estuaries are tragic and 
unacceptable. The St. Lucie River and Caloosahatchee River estuar-
ies were devastated after the Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) 
released billions of gallons of polluted fresh water from Lake Okee-
chobee into the estuaries during a particularly rainy season.1 The 
outdated Herbert Hoover Dike surrounding Lake Okeechobee can 
only withstand so much water pressure, and with water levels ap-
proaching the maximum level of safety, the Army Corps chose to re-
lease lake water into the estuaries to the east and west rather than 
risk a breach of the dike, which would flood cities and farmland to 
the south.2  
 During and after these events, local citizens, nonprofit environ-
mental organizations, and local and state politicians were vocal in 
their collective opposition to, and disapproval of, the Army Corps‘ 
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 1. Lizette Alvarez, In South Florida, a Polluted Bubble Ready to Burst, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/us/lake-okeechobee-in-florida-a-polluted-
bubble-ready-to-burst.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0. 
 2. Id. 
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choices regarding Lake Okeechobee water releases. The Army Corps 
maintains plenary jurisdiction over the dike and the regulation of 
water releases under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and the 
Clean Water Act (CWA),3 and there are allegations that the agency 
has failed in its mission to properly regulate and maintain the infra-
structure that keeps this delicate ecosystem in a constant state of 
flux.4 Many people called for reforms, and in February 2014, the Flor-
ida Senate sent a letter to Congress asking that it transfer authority 
over water releases from the Army Corps to the Florida Department 
of Environmental Protection (FDEP).5  
 A full assessment of the failed regulation of Lake Okeechobee and 
the surrounding estuaries is beyond the scope of this Note. Rather, 
this Note focuses on a narrower aspect of the problem: the Army 
Corps‘ plenary jurisdiction over the Herbert Hoover Dike and the 
regulation of water releases into the estuaries. It discusses the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of retaining jurisdiction in the Army 
Corps versus transferring jurisdiction to the FDEP, and it reaches 
the following conclusion: neither is best suited to manage this prob-
lem. Therefore, this Note proposes the transfer of jurisdictional pow-
er from the Army Corps to a new quasi-governmental commission 
composed of various interested parties—public and private—at the 
federal, state, and local level. This commission would make decisions 
about the regulation and maintenance of Lake Okeechobee and the 
Herbert Hoover Dike. Ideally, it would also oversee the implementa-
tion of short- and long-term restoration plans—both of which are al-
ready being discussed—to stop or significantly reduce the water re-
leased into the estuaries.6 There are several reasons why this solu-
tion is preferable to either the Army Corps maintaining jurisdiction 
or the FDEP obtaining jurisdiction. As will be discussed in greater 
depth below, a quasi-governmental organization would: (1) provide 
management flexibility and efficiency, (2) represent and incorporate 
the interests of various parties, (3) utilize the institutional knowledge 
and expertise of those who are closer to the resource, and (4) have the 
                                                                                                                                              
 3. See infra Part III. 
 4. Andy Reid, Scott Blames Feds for Lake Okeechobee Flooding Threats, Draining 
Problems, SUN SENTINEL (Aug. 20, 2013), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-08-
20/news/fl-lake-okeechobee-draining-help-20130820_1_caloosahatchee-dike-lake-okeechobee 
(―Blaming ‗inaction‘ by the Army Corps of Engineers for the lake flooding threats and the 
polluting discharges, Scott called for an immediate influx of federal spending on strength-
ening the lake‘s dike and in backlogged Everglades restoration projects that are supposed 
to create alternatives for dumping lake water to the east and west.‖). 
 5. See infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.  
 6. SELECT COMMITTEE ON INDIAN RIVER LAGOON AND LAKE OKEECHOBEE BASIN, 
FINAL REPORT 14-18 (Nov. 8, 2013) [hereinafter SELECT COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT], avail-
able at http://www.flsenate.gov/usercontent/topics/irllob/finalreport.pdf; Alvarez, supra 
note 1 (discussing various proposals and projects). 
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ability to obtain private funding in a time of public funding reduc-
tions and constrained budgets. 
 Part II briefly summarizes the history of Lake Okeechobee and 
the events that unfolded in 2013 during and after the water releases 
that overwhelmed the estuaries. Part III discusses the history of the 
Army Corps‘ jurisdiction over navigable waterways, including its ex-
pansion under the CWA. Then, Part IV analyzes arguments for and 
against reserving the Army Corps‘ jurisdiction over Lake Okeechobee 
water releases and the Herbert Hoover Dike. It also argues for a co-
operative federalism regime in which a quasi-governmental organiza-
tion is formed, which, as will be explained, is the best solution for 
balancing the various interests of all parties involved. Part V high-
lights what such a transfer of power would look like and how a quasi-
governmental organization could be formed. Part VI concludes. 
II.   THE HISTORY AND CURRENT REGIME SURROUNDING 
THE LAKE OKEECHOBEE BASIN 
A.   How Did We Get Here? 
 The regulation of the Lake Okeechobee Basin is complex, and the 
problem has existed for decades.7 At 730 square miles, Lake Okee-
chobee is the largest lake in the southeastern United States, though 
it is extremely shallow, with an average lake-wide depth of nine feet.8 
Lake Okeechobee naturally receives water from the north, ―from a 
watershed . . . that includes the Upper Kissimmee Chain of Lakes, 
the Kissimmee River,‖ and other smaller lakes, creeks, and drainage 
basins.9 The Eleventh Circuit recently explained the history and cur-
rent state of the lake, which is worth quoting at length:  
 Historically, the lake had an ill-defined southern shoreline be-
cause during rainy seasons it overflowed, spilling a wide, shallow 
sheet of water overland to the Florida Bay. ―But progress came 
and took its toll, and in the name of flood control, they made their 
plans and they drained the land.‖ 
 In the 1930s the Herbert Hoover Dike was built along the 
southern shore of Lake Okeechobee. It was intended to control 
flooding but failed during the hurricanes of 1947 and 1948. Con-
                                                                                                                                              
 7. Andy Reid, People Criticize Lake Okeechobee Draining Delays, SUN SENTINEL 
(Aug. 9, 2013), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-08-09/news/fl-lake-pollution-response-
20130808_1_caloosahatchee-lake-okeechobee-u-s-sugar-land. 
 8. Restoring Lake Okeechobee, S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., http://my.sfwmd.gov/ 
portal/page/portal/xweb%20protecting%20and%20restoring/lake%20okeechobee (last visit-
ed Jan. 18, 2015).  
 9. R. THOMAS JAMES & JOYCE ZHANG, 2008 SOUTH FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT 
10-5 (2008), available at http://www.sfwmd.gov/portal/page/portal/pg_grp_sfwmd_sfer/ 
portlet_sfer/tab2236041/volume1/chapters/v1_ch_10.pdf.  
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gress then authorized the Central and Southern Florida Flood Pro-
ject; as part of it the Army Corps of Engineers expanded the Hoo-
ver Dike and built pump stations including S–2, S–3, and S–4. 
Under the modern version of that project, nearly all water flow in 
South Florida is controlled by a complex system of gates, dikes, 
canals, and pump stations. 
 The area south of Lake Okeechobee‘s shoreline was designated 
the Everglades Agricultural Area. The Corps dug canals there to 
collect rainwater and runoff from the sugar cane fields and the 
surrounding industrial and residential areas. Not surprisingly, 
those canals contain a loathsome concoction of chemical contami-
nants including nitrogen, phosphorous, and un-ionized ammonia. 
The water in the canals is full of suspended and dissolved solids 
and has a low oxygen content.  
 Those polluted canals connect to Lake Okeechobee, which is 
now virtually surrounded by the Hoover Dike.10 
The above passage describes how pollution makes its way into the 
lake. This is an important and controversial problem in itself and has 
been the subject of multiple lawsuits.11 However, this Note focuses on 
what happens next in the regulation of this intricate water system.  
 When the water level of Lake Okeechobee reaches its limit, the 
Army Corps releases the polluted fresh water into the delicate St. 
Lucie River and Caloosahatchee River estuaries.12 This is nothing 
new; the Army Corps has been overseeing water releases for many 
years. The difference is that during the summer of 2013, heavy rain 
caused the water level to rise so quickly that the Corps was forced to 
open the proverbial floodgates and inundate the estuaries with pol-
luted fresh water.13 The estuaries are composed of ―brackish water 
with higher salinity levels [to] support a delicate ecosystem. The 
fresh water lowered the salinity levels and oysters, sea grasses and 
other wildlife began dying.‖14 Toxic algae bloomed, and water condi-
tions were so poor in August that signs were posted to warn people to 
                                                                                                                                              
 10. Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th 
Cir. 2009) (footnotes omitted). 
 11. See, e.g., id.; see also Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. 
Dist., 559 F.3d 1191, 1192-93 (11th Cir. 2009) (making parallel arguments to those made in 
Friends of the Everglades); Fla. Wildlife Fed., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng‘rs, No. 
4:12cv355-RH/CAS, 2013 WL 5436707 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2013) (alleging the Army Corps 
is operating water-control structures along the Okeechobee Waterway in a manner that 
violates state water-quality standards). 
 12. Liz Balmaseda, Corps Increases Flow of Lake O Waters into St. Lucie Estuary, 
Caloosahatchee River; Move Follows Environmental Problems, PALM BEACH POST (Sept. 21, 
2013, 10:56 AM), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/corps-increases-flow-of-lake-o-
waters-into-st-luci/nZ4N4/. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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stay out of the water.15 One only needs to see the photographs of 
brown water pouring out of the lake and into the rivers; the massive, 
toxic brown and green algae blooms overtaking the naturally vibrant 
blue water; and dead flora and fauna (including manatees) to com-
prehend the seriousness of this problem.16 The releases have had 
negative effects on the region‘s economy, as well.17   
 However, it is important to note that water releases from Lake 
Okeechobee are not the sole cause of this delicate ecosystem‘s de-
cline.18 ―Rather it has been a combination of factors that have result-
ed in what some scientists have referred to as ‗the perfect storm.‘ ‖19 
Comprehensive regulation of the lake and its natural and artificial 
tributaries is necessary to solve this problem. Water releases into the 
surrounding estuaries, however, have a direct negative impact on the 
health of these ecosystems, and the releases need to be addressed as 
part of a complete restoration plan. 
 In any event, residents are angry, frustrated, and powerless, and 
the overlapping participation of several entities can be confusing. Is 
Congress, the Army Corps, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agen-
cy (EPA), the Florida Legislature, the state‘s Governor, FDEP, or the 
South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) to blame? De-
pending on whom you ask, the fault allocation among the various en-
tities is likely to change. At the very least, the federal government is 
not solely to blame, even if Florida Governor Rick Scott currently 
disagrees.20 For example, when Charlie Crist was governor, the state 
began constructing a water reservoir for use as an alternative to re-
leasing water into the estuaries, but construction was later aban-
doned after spending millions of dollars on it.21 Also, environmental-
ists point out that Governor Scott and the Florida Legislature have 
cut funding to the SFWMD in recent years and that ―inexperienced 
managers‖ have been appointed to the governing board.22 And Gover-
nor Scott only turned his attention to Lake Okeechobee after the 
                                                                                                                                              
 15. Id. 
 16. Devastating Photos of Florida Pollution Will Fill You with Rage, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Oct. 3, 2013, 8:52 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/02/lake-okeechobee-
pollution_n_4031154.html. The photographs come from Congressman Patrick Murphy‘s 
official Facebook page. Last summer, he asked local residents to send him photos of the 
devastation, which he then compiled into an album of over one hundred photos entitled, 
―Show Congress the Crisis of Our Waterways.‖ See id. 
 17. See SELECT COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 10; Reid, supra note 7. 
 18. SELECT COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Reid, supra note 4.  
 21. Discharges a Symbol of Failed Water Policies, SUN SENTINEL (July 25, 2013), 
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-07-25/news/fl-dlyons-editorial-dumping-20130725_1_ 
caloosahatchee-water-district-hoover-dike. 
 22. Alvarez, supra note 1. 
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events of last summer.23 Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Ar-
my Corps maintains plenary jurisdiction over the Herbert Hoover 
Dike and water releases into the estuaries.24 Hopefully what hap-
pened last summer will finally act as the catalyst for reform; not 
piecemeal, ad hoc fixes that deal only with immediate issues, but real 
reform about the manner in which this extremely important, delicate, 
and complex water system is regulated.  
B.   The Senate Select Committee on Indian River 
Lagoon and Lake Okeechobee Basin 
 Due to the growing concern over environmental damage from con-
tinued water releases and questionable decision-making by the Army 
Corps, the Florida Senate Select Committee on Indian River Lagoon 
and Lake Okeechobee Basin (IRLLOB) was formed on July 10, 
2013.25 The Select Committee‘s purpose was to review water man-
agement policies in the Basin, assess the environmental impacts of 
water releases, identify options for improvement at the state and fed-
eral level, and ―[d]evelop recommendations for improved water man-
agement.‖26 The Select Committee released a report on November 8, 
2013, in which it ―recommends amending the operational jurisdiction 
of the Army Corps of Engineers to give the State of Florida, specifi-
cally the Department of Environmental Protection, authority over 
regulatory releases when the risk of dike failure is less than 10 per-
cent.‖27 In addition, when the risk of dike failure is greater than ten 
percent, the report discusses procedures for providing the Army 
Corps with 24-hours‘ notice before the State of Florida decides 
whether to maintain control or to temporarily cede control to the Ar-
my Corps.28 As a result of the Select Committee‘s report, State Sena-
                                                                                                                                              
 23. See id. 
 24. The South Florida Water Management District published its Final Adaptive Pro-
tocols for Lake Okeechobee Operations in 2010, which were developed in cooperation with 
the Army Corps and the FDEP. The introduction summarizes the evolution of decision-
making regarding Lake Okeechobee water releases from the early 1990s to present and 
highlights the relationship between the SFWMD and the Army Corps. It is true that the 
two entities have worked together to undertake studies of the issue, but in the end, the 
SFWMD (or any other entity) is limited to making recommendations, requests, and sugges-
tions to the Army Corps. The day-to-day decision-making remains solely within the federal 
agency‘s jurisdiction and control. See S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., FINAL ADAPTIVE 
PROTOCOLS FOR LAKE OKEECHOBEE OPERATIONS iii-v (2010) [hereinafter SFWMD FINAL 
ADAPTIVE PROTOCOLS], available at http://www.sfwmd.gov/portal/page/portal/xrepository/ 
sfwmd_repository_pdf/ap_lo_final_20100916.pdf.  
 25. Letter from Don Gaetz, President of the Fla. Senate, to Debbie Brown, Sec‘y of the 
Fla. Senate (July 10, 2013), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/usercontent/topics/ 
IRLLOB/07-10-2013-Creating_IRLLOB_Senate_Select_Committee.pdf. 
 26. Id. 
 27. SELECT COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 21. 
 28. Id. 
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tor Joe Negron, chair of the Select Committee, wrote a letter to Con-
gress asking that it remove the Army Corps‘ sole jurisdiction over the 
lake.29 Senator Negron stated that the Army Corps ―has [recently] 
demonstrated a willingness to be more proactive and coordinate with 
the South Florida Water Management District to manage lake lev-
els.‖30 He also noted that the Army Corps uses its plenary power to 
make decisions ―even when those actions conflict with the state water 
managers‘ better judgment‖ and thus asked Congress to ―rebalance 
this delegation of responsibility and authority.‖31 As of this writing, 
Congress has yet to respond.  
 The solution proposed in this Note is thus similar to the Select 
Committee‘s proposal in that it seeks to divest the Army Corps of 
plenary jurisdiction, but it is also different in several fundamental 
respects that will be addressed later. Furthermore, while the Select 
Committee‘s proposal seems simple and straightforward, in actuality, 
removing jurisdiction from the Army Corps and placing it in a differ-
ent entity is serious and complex, and it would alter the current bal-
ance of federal and state power. The origins of this power are dis-
cussed in the following Part.  
III.   JURISDICTION OVER NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS 
 In addition to the duties the Army Corps performs for the Army in 
times of conflict, its civil engineering jurisdiction has evolved, con-
tracted, and expanded over the last two centuries. Currently, the 
Army Corps maintains jurisdiction over certain important aspects of 
water resources management, including the authorization and regu-
lation of all structures built in, on, or across navigable waters of the 
United States pursuant to section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 
1899.32 The Army Corps also maintains control over all dredging and 
filling of navigable waters under section 404 of the CWA.33 Historical-
ly, the Army Corps‘ jurisdiction has covered transportation (e.g., 
bridges and roads), civil projects (e.g., lighthouses, public buildings, 
and monuments), and surveying (e.g., much of the West and the 
Great Lakes).34 However, this Note limits its focus to the evolution 
                                                                                                                                              
 29. Letter from Joe Negron, Fla. State Sen., to Jeff Miller, U.S. Rep. (Feb. 18, 2014), 
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/usercontent/topics/IRLLOB/02-18-14-Senator_Negron_ 
Letter_CODEL.pdf. 
 30. Id. at 1-2. 
 31. Id. at 2. 
 32. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 10, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151 (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2012)).  
 33. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 404, 86 Stat. 816, 884 (1972) (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012)). 
 34. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A Brief History, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG‘RS, 
http://www.usace.army.mil/About/History/BriefHistoryoftheCorps.aspx (last visited Jan. 
18, 2015). 
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and expansion of the Army Corps‘ control over ―navigable waters of 
the United States.‖35 In order to understand the current state of af-
fairs regarding the regulation of the Lake Okeechobee Basin, it is 
important to review precisely how the Army Corps came into power 
in the first place.  
A.   The Case Law Defining Navigability  
 The U.S. Constitution indirectly mentions water only once; Article 
III, Section 2 states that ―all Cases of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction‖ are within federal judicial control.36 What this means is that 
admiralty cases must be heard in federal court; state courts do not 
have jurisdiction to hear these disputes. Admiralty jurisdiction is im-
portant ―because of the seminal role it played in defining ‗navigabil-
ity‘ in early U.S. law, and the subsequent adoption of some of the 
same principles in other definitions of navigable waters.‖37 Essential-
ly, the definition of ―navigable waters,‖ developed by the courts in the 
nineteenth century to define the scope of federal admiralty jurisdic-
tion, was exported to other areas of federal law when Congress 
sought to expand the scope of its power over the country‘s waters. 
 In England, a special court existed that heard only admiralty dis-
putes at the time the U.S. Constitution was drafted, and the English 
court‘s jurisdiction was limited to waters affected by the ebb and flow 
of the tide.38 In the early years of the Republic, American courts es-
sentially adopted the English definition and narrowly construed fed-
eral admiralty jurisdiction to encompass only coastal and tidal wa-
ters.39 This limitation was abandoned in Waring v. Clark,40 which 
acted as a catalyst for the expansion of the definition of navigability 
in the United States. In The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,41 
the Supreme Court demonstrated the effects of Waring by adopting a 
new, broader definition of the term navigability. This change was due 
in part to the realization and acceptance that the geography of the 
United States was far different than that of England; for example, 
the Court noted that the Mississippi River is navigable well beyond 
the location at which the tide ceases to have any effect.42 It would be 
―purely artificial and arbitrary as well as unjust‖ to draw a line 
across the Mississippi River, as commerce took place on the river 
                                                                                                                                              
 35. See Clean Water Act § 404; Rivers and Harbors Act § 10. 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 37. ROBERT W. ADLER, ROBIN K. CRAIG & NOAH D. HALL, MODERN WATER LAW 283 (2013). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 283-84 (collecting cases).  
 40. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847). 
 41. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). 
 42. Id. at 456-57. 
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above and below this location.43 The Court‘s new, broader definition 
made jurisdiction ―depend upon the navigable character of the water, 
and not upon the ebb and flow of the tide. If the water was navigable 
it was deemed to be public; and if public, was regarded as within the 
legitimate scope of the [federal] admiralty jurisdiction.‖44 Thus, the 
important factor for the Court was whether the water body could 
maintain commerce, not whether the water body was tidal in nature. 
This was an important and necessary first step in the federal gov-
ernment‘s desire to expand its regulatory power over U.S. waters.  
 In a separate doctrinal field nearly three decades earlier, the Su-
preme Court clarified the ambiguity between commerce and naviga-
tion in Gibbons v. Ogden.45 There, the Court held that limiting acces-
sibility to a state‘s navigable waters gives rise to a Commerce Clause 
violation, as this unconstitutionally infringes upon Congress‘s power 
to regulate commerce.46 In response to the challenge that navigation 
is not a commercial transaction, the Court explained that so long as 
navigation has the capability to affect interstate commerce, it can be 
regulated under Congress‘s Commerce Clause power.47 Thus, this de-
cision, combined with the Court‘s later opinion in The Propeller Gene-
see Chief, opened the door for the Supreme Court to address the scope 
of the navigability doctrine—as previously developed in admiralty 
law—in the context of the Commerce Clause.48 In The Daniel Ball, 
the Supreme Court put a name to its new test: navigability in fact.49 
More specifically, the Court stated that ―[t]hose rivers must be re-
garded as public navigable waters in law which are navigable in 
fact.‖ 50  Further, ―they constitute navigable waters of the United 
States . . . when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, 
or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which 
commerce is or may be carried on with other States . . . .‖51 Thus, the 
test has two elements that must be established before the federal 
government can claim jurisdiction over the water body: (1) it must be 
in its ordinary condition, and (2) it must form a continued highway 
for commerce.52 These elements have been construed quite broadly in 
later cases, however.53 
                                                                                                                                              
 43. Id. at 457. 
 44. Id.  
 45. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 46. See id. at 89-91. 
 47. See id.  
 48. ADLER, CRAIG & HALL, supra note 37, at 289. 
 49. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. ADLER, CRAIG & HALL, supra note 37, at 291. 
 53. See id. at 291-92 (citing examples of the Court‘s broad construction of these elements).  
294  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:285 
 
 In addition to the expansion of Congress‘s jurisdiction over the 
physical location of navigable waters, the Court in United States v. 
Appalachian Electric Power articulated the full scope of Congress‘s 
Commerce Clause powers over several ancillary issues of navigabil-
ity.54 Encompassed within the concept of commerce for navigability 
purposes is more than just the regulation of boats on the water; 
commerce also includes flood control, watershed management, and 
the creation of electricity sources.55 As a result of this evolution in the 
case law, much of the ambiguity surrounding the limits of federal ju-
risdiction over waters of the United States was resolved, and the fed-
eral government thus gained the potential for control over most of 
this country‘s waters.56  
B.   The Clean Water Act 
 Using its articulated power, Congress enacted a statute in 1948 
that attempted to address the problems of water pollution through-
out the United States.57 The CWA in its current form is the result of 
amendments to the original statute in 1972.58 The amendments over 
the years progressively gave more regulatory power to the federal 
government, and the 1972 amendments solidified federal regulatory 
control over certain aspects of water management and pollution con-
trol of navigable waters.59 The term ―navigable waters‖ is defined in 
the CWA as ―the waters of the United States, including the territorial 
seas.‖60 This term has been litigated many times, and the Supreme 
Court most recently articulated its definition in Rapanos v. United 
                                                                                                                                              
 54. 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940). 
 55. Id. In addition, the Supreme Court held that ―[t]o appraise the evidence on navi-
gability on the natural condition only of the waterway is erroneous. Its availability for 
navigation must also be considered.‖ Id. at 407 (emphasis added). The Court explained that 
some artificial improvement to a waterway to make it navigable in fact (and the question of 
what constitutes too much improvement) is ―a matter of degree.‖ Id. The improvements 
need not be completed or even begun before jurisdiction attaches. Id. at 408. Also, it is im-
portant to note the Court‘s statement that ―[o]nce found to be navigable, a waterway re-
mains so.‖ Id. 
 56. This author says the ―potential‖ for control because, for reasons that may seem 
obvious, the federal government must first affirmatively determine whether a particular 
water body is ―navigable‖ before it may assert jurisdiction over it. Once a water body is 
deemed navigable, certain statutory regimes take effect, and the federal government has 
expressly preempted state jurisdiction (e.g., CWA NPDES permitting). For other types of 
regulation concerning a navigable water that are not expressly preempted by Congress, 
there may still be dormant preclusion under the Supreme Court‘s holding in Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 57. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 755. 
 58. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012)); see also ADLER, CRAIG & HALL, supra note 37, at 557. 
 59. ADLER, CRAIG & HALL, supra note 37, at 557-58. 
 60. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). 
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States.61 In that case, the Supreme Court narrowed the EPA‘s broad 
definition of ―waters of the United States‖ in regards to wetlands ad-
jacent to a traditional navigable water; however, the extent of the 
limitation is not certain. This is because the main opinion only con-
sisted of a plurality of four Justices, led by Justice Scalia, who articu-
lated a narrow definition of ―waters,‖62 while Justice Kennedy‘s con-
currence explicated a different, broader, and more fact-specific defini-
tion of the term.63 Justice Kennedy‘s test is known as the ―significant 
nexus‖ test, because it requires ―the existence of a significant nexus 
between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the tradi-
tional sense. . . . [I]f the wetlands . . . significantly affect the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more 
readily understood as ‗navigable,‘ ‖ then that water body may also be 
regulated under the CWA.64 As a result of the Supreme Court‘s fail-
ure to reach a majority, states were free to adopt either Justice Scal-
ia‘s narrower definition or Justice Kennedy‘s broader definition. A 
circuit split has since emerged, with most circuits either adopting 
Justice Kennedy‘s test or holding that either test applies.65  
 The two most well-known provisions of the CWA are sections 402 
and 404. Section 402 regulates discharges of pollutants from point 
sources, which excludes agricultural and other nonpoint source run-
off.66 Essentially, if an entity wishes to discharge pollutants into a 
water of the United States, it must obtain a National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) permit from the EPA or from a 
state agency that, pursuant to a cooperative federalism provision in 
the statute, has been authorized and delegated to run the program.67 
Such a provision requires that the state agency demonstrate to the 
EPA that it is qualified to implement the program before the EPA 
will cede jurisdiction.68 In Florida, the EPA has authorized the FDEP 
                                                                                                                                              
 61. 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion).  
 62. Id. at 732. Specifically, Justice Scalia‘s definition limits ―waters‖ to include ―only 
relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water.‖ Id. Importantly, this definition 
limited the Army Corps‘ section 404 jurisdiction over wetlands that are only saturated 
intermittently, not permanently. See id. 
 63. Id. at 779-80 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 64. Id.  
 65. Keith A. Johnston & Kristine Sendek-Smith, Muddy Waters: Recent Developments 
Under the Clean Water Act, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV‘T, Winter 2010, at 31, 34. As of this 
writing, the EPA has issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to clarify the definition of 
―waters of the United States,‖ which essentially adopts Justice Kennedy‘s ―significant nex-
us‖ test for tributaries and adjacent wetlands. See Definition of ―Waters of the United 
States‖ Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 22,188 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014) (to be 
codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.). 
 66. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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to manage the NPDES permitting program within the state.69 In ad-
dition, Congress left control over nonpoint source pollution (e.g., run-
off from the land and atmospheric deposition of pollutants) to the 
states to manage as each sees fit, so long as minimum federal water 
quality standards are met.70 In Florida, the FDEP develops these wa-
ter quality standards and implements them with the aid of the five 
water management districts.71 The second provision of the CWA, sec-
tion 404, encompasses ―the discharge of dredged or fill material into 
the navigable waters‖ of the United States, which requires a permit 
from the Army Corps.72  In sum, ―[f]rom a federalism perspective, 
Congress designed the Clean Water Act to reflect a balance between 
national uniformity in some respects and individual state needs in 
others.‖ 73  Confusion regarding overlapping jurisdictional authority 
has not been entirely eradicated, however, as the resource in ques-
tion is not always easy to conceptualize, quantify, and manage; that 
is, water is a fluid resource. The regulation of the Lake Okeechobee 
Basin provides a good example of this ambiguity and jurisdictional 
overlap. 
 In the early twentieth century, the Army Corps built a complex 
system of ―spillways, locks, pump stations, culverts, canals, reser-
                                                                                                                                              
 69. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), FLA. DEP‘T OF 
ENVTL. PROT., http://www.dep.state.fl.us/water/stormwater/npdes/index.htm (last updated 
Dec. 19, 2014).  
 70. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313, 1329, 1362(14); see also ADLER, CRAIG & HALL, supra note 
37, at 561. 
 71. STORMWATER/NONPOINT SOURCE MGMT. SECTION, FLA. DEP‘T OF ENVTL. PROT., 
FLORIDA: NONPOINT SOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM UPDATE 16 (1999), available at 
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/water/nonpoint/docs/319h/nps2000.pdf; Nonpoint Source Man-
agement Program, FLA. DEP‘T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.dep.state.fl.us/water/nonpoint/ 
(last updated Sept. 25, 2013). 
 72. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). Similar to section 402, the CWA provides states the oppor-
tunity to take over section 404 permitting—to an extent. Unlike the NPDES permitting 
program, if a state wishes to administer its own section 404 permitting regime, its jurisdic-
tion only extends to those waters deemed ―non-navigable‖ under federal law. See 
id. § 1344(g); see also State or Tribal Assumption of the Section 404 Permit Program, U.S. 
EPA, http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/fact23.cfm (last updated July 1, 2014). 
From this author‘s reading of the statutory provision and EPA‘s explanation on its website, 
this limitation maintains the status quo—that is, the Army Corps retains jurisdiction over 
all section 404 permitting for navigable waters of the United States, and the states may 
administer dredge-and-fill permitting for non-navigable waters over which the federal gov-
ernment never had jurisdiction anyway. It appears that what this ―cooperative federalism‖ 
provision does is simply allow states to utilize and incorporate the federal section 404 re-
gime as its own, which is why authorization is required from the EPA. See id. However, it 
is important to note that states do retain some power over section 404 permitting pursuant 
to section 401 of the CWA, which requires state certification of compliance with federal and 
state water quality standards before a federal permit may be issued. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341; 
see also PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep‘t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994). 
 73. ADLER, CRAIG & HALL, supra note 37, at 561.  
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voirs, and water conservation areas‖ in South Florida.74 Interestingly, 
the operational control of this system has since been transferred from 
the Army Corps to the SFWMD.75 Among other things, the network of 
canals and pump stations artificially diverts agricultural, industrial, 
and residential runoff away from the agricultural lands to the south 
and carries the runoff to Lake Okeechobee, which pollutes the water 
that is periodically released into the estuaries when the lake‘s water 
level reaches its limit.76 It is important to note that because the pol-
luted canal water being pumped into the lake comes from nonpoint 
source pollutants, there is no NPDES permit requirement by the 
EPA or FDEP, and there is no Army Corps permit requirement, as 
the pollutants are not considered dredge or fill material. The FDEP 
and SFWMD regulate nonpoint source pollution under the provision 
of the CWA that requires states to create and implement water quali-
ty-based standards, which allows for the inclusion of nonpoint source 
pollution when deciding how to enforce them.77 The FDEP thus regu-
lates pollutants from all sources, and for those water bodies that are 
―impaired,‖ the agency must determine the ―total maximum daily 
load‖ (TMDL) for each pollutant and allocate the allowable daily 
amount among all of the water body‘s polluters.78 The main pollutant 
                                                                                                                                              
 74. Water Management, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG‘RS, http://www.saj.usace.army. 
mil/Missions/CivilWorks/WaterManagement.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2015).  
 75. Operational Planning, SFWMD, http://www.sfwmd.gov/portal/page/portal/ 
xweb%20-%20release%202/operational%20planning (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (―With ap-
proximately 2,100 miles of canals and 2,000 miles of levees/berms, 70 pump stations and 
more than 600 water control structures and 625 project culverts, the District actively oper-
ates and maintains the water management system to protect regional water supplies and 
provide flood control for 8.1 million people—plus the environment, agriculture, businesses 
and visitors—in South Florida.‖); see also Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. 
Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2009) (―Those polluted canals connect to Lake Okee-
chobee, which is now virtually surrounded by the Hoover Dike. The S–2, S–3, and S–4 
pump stations are built into the dike and pump water from the lower levels in the canals 
outside the dike into the higher lake water. . . . At full capacity, the pumps within the S–2, 
S–3, and S–4 stations can each move 900 cubic feet of water per second—more than 
400,000 gallons per minute. The South Florida Water Management District operates the 
pumping stations.‖). 
 76. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12. 
 77. See STORMWATER/NONPOINT SOURCE MGMT. SECTION, supra note 71, at 14-16. 
 78. See id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2012); Everglades: Lake Okeechobee, FLA. 
DEP‘T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.dep.state.fl.us/everglades/lakeo.htm (last updated May 
17, 2013). After several years of litigation involving the EPA, FDEP, and environmental 
nonprofits, the FDEP finalized updated numeric nutrient criteria (i.e., TMDLs) of several 
nutrients for the various water bodies throughout the state, including nitrogen and phos-
phorus in Lake Okeechobee and the estuaries, in 2013. The updated criteria went into 
effect on September 17, 2014, when the EPA formally withdrew its competing numeric 
nutrient criteria. See EPA, NUMERIC NUTRIENT CRITERIA FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA: 
WITHDRAWING THE FEDERAL ACTIONS (2014), available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/ 
rulesregs/upload/Numeric-Nutrient-Criteria-for-the-State-of-Florida-Withdrawing-the-
Federal-Actions-Factsheet.pdf; see also Development of Numeric Nutrient Criteria for Flori-
da’s Waters, FLA. DEP‘T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.dep.state.fl.us/water/wqssp/nutrients/ 
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of concern in the Lake Okeechobee Basin is phosphorous, which con-
tinues to be discharged into the lake at a rate exceeding that which is 
necessary to maintain a healthy ecosystem. 79  Only time will tell 
whether the FDEP‘s newly updated TMDL for phosphorus has an 
appreciable effect on lowering the level of this pollutant in the Lake 
Okeechobee Basin.  
 In 2002, environmental nonprofits filed suit against the SFWMD 
in an attempt to limit the water management district‘s authority to 
freely pump polluted canal water originating from nonpoint sources. 
Specifically, in Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water 
Management District,80 the parties argued over the definition of ―dis-
charge of a pollutant‖ in relation to NPDES permitting requirements. 
A NPDES permit is required for the ―discharge of any pollutant,‖ and 
―discharge‖ is defined as ―any addition of any pollutant to navigable 
waters from any point source.‖ 81  The plaintiffs argued that ―the 
transfer of a pollutant from one navigable body of water to another 
[constituted] a ‗discharge of a pollutant‘ within the meaning of the 
Clean Water Act.‖82 In other words, the plaintiffs believed that the 
artificial pumping stations used to pump polluted water from the ca-
nals into Lake Okeechobee constituted a separate ―point source,‖ 
such that the SFWMD should be required to obtain a NDPES permit 
before discharging pollutants into a navigable water—here, the lake 
itself.83 The Eleventh Circuit noted that other circuits had previously 
agreed with similar arguments and ruled in favor of requiring 
NPDES permits.84 And it appears that the Court agreed in theory 
with this line of decisions; however, the EPA had recently promul-
gated a new regulation that took the opposite view.85 The EPA‘s ―wa-
ter transfers‖ rule exempts water transfers from NPDES permitting, 
― ‗defin[ing] water transfers as an activity that conveys or connects 
waters of the United States without subjecting the transferred water 
to intervening industrial, municipal, or commercial use.‘ ‖86 The Elev-
enth Circuit undertook a Chevron analysis of this new rule, and it 
determined that the definitions within the CWA were sufficiently 
                                                                                                                                              
(last updated Sept. 8, 2014); Nutrients Water Quality Standards for the State of Florida, U.S. 
EPA, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/rulesregs/florida-index.cfm (last updated Sept. 25, 2014). 
 79. Everglades: Lake Okeechobee, supra note 78. 
 80. 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 81. Id. at 1216 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342(a)(1), 1362(12)).  
 82. Id. at 1213.  
 83. See id. at 1216. 
 84. Id. at 1217-18 (discussing decisions of other circuits).  
 85. Id. at 1218. 
 86. Id. at 1218-19 (quoting NPDES Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,697 (June 
13, 2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i))).  
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ambiguous to move on to step two.87 Thus, so long as the agency‘s in-
terpretation was reasonable, which the Court found it to be, the 
Court was bound to give effect to the rule.88  
 This case demonstrates the complexity of the overlapping jurisdic-
tion of the Lake Okeechobee Basin, with different entities having 
control over different aspects of the system‘s resources. While the 
Army Corps has control over the water releases into the estuaries, 
the FDEP and the SFWMD have control over the levels of phospho-
rus and other pollutants that run off into the canals, whose waters 
ultimately end up in the lake. Also, the Army Corps transferred op-
erational authority over the complex network of physical infrastruc-
ture to the SFWMD, and the water management district provides the 
Army Corps with much of the data that it uses to make decisions.89 
Thus, these groups currently work in coordination with one another, 
but only to a certain extent. For example, the Army Corps did not 
consult with the SFWMD, FDEP, or any other entity before choosing 
to release the deluge of water that caused last summer‘s devastation 
to the estuaries.90 The following Part addresses this federal, state, 
and local jurisdictional overlap and argues that jurisdiction should be 
transferred to a new, quasi-governmental entity.  
IV.   FEDERALISM AND THE QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 
 In its basic form, federalism is ―the distribution of power in an or-
ganization (as a government) between a central authority and the 
constituent units.‖91 In the United States, federalism describes the 
balance of power and authority between the federal government and 
the states, based on concepts and boundaries articulated in the U.S. 
Constitution.92 In the context of environmental law generally, and 
water law more precisely, federalism plays an important role in de-
                                                                                                                                              
 87. Id. at 1222-27. 
 88. Id. at 1219-20, 1227-28. 
 89. See Operational Planning, supra note 75 (―Operational Planning includes the re-
view and development of operating protocols and plans, coordination with District groups 
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers regarding Operating Manual review and develop-
ment. Operational Planning uses the current state of the system (Lake Okeechobee levels 
and groundwater levels) as input to the South Florida Water Management Model 
(SFWMM). A suite of graphics are produced for the decision makers to analyze. The appli-
cation involves the investigation of potential areas of flexibility in the South Florida Water 
Management District water control system operational guidelines and federal regulation 
water level schedules. The objective is to improve the water resource evaluation tools 
available to water managers to develop a comprehensive set of operational performance 
measures and to provide a forum for public input to operations.‖). 
 90. See SELECT COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 10, 21. 
 91. Federalism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
federalism (last visited Jan. 18, 2015). 
 92. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contem-
porary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (1995).  
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fining the boundaries of federal and state control.93 In the context of 
this Note, the federal government expressly preempted Florida from 
regulating in some areas, while in other areas, Congress paved the 
way for a cooperative federalism regime in which Florida was allowed 
to take over regulatory authority after receiving approval from the 
EPA or the Army Corps. Still in other areas, Congress affirmatively 
required Florida to take the lead role. But what about quasi-
governmental organizations—where do they fit into this picture? Be-
fore addressing this question in depth, the following section briefly 
describes the quasi-governmental organization.  
A.   Public-Private Partnership: 
The Quasi-Governmental Organization 
 Simply put, quasi-governmental organizations are ―hybrids‖—that 
is, ―entities that combine characteristics of public- and private-sector 
organizations.‖ 94  More specifically, they ―combine authority from 
more than one level of government, whether as a formal or informal 
part of their structure or governance process, and also include pri-
vate and public actors within the governance process.‖95 Hybrid or-
ganizations purportedly combine the ―best of both worlds,‖ so to 
speak, by providing the efficiency and resources of the private market 
and the accountability of the public domain.96 In addition, hybrid or-
ganizations are each unique; they exist on a continuum of organiza-
tional power vis-à-vis government regulatory oversight and control, 
public-private monetary funding, and composition of the organiza-
tion‘s board members.97 In 2003, there existed more than fifty quasi-
governmental organizations at the federal level and several hundreds 
at the state and local level.98 These entities oversee many important 
interests and perform essential functions for the government and so-
ciety, some more prominent than others (e.g., the Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey versus the management of railroads),99 
and as of 2003 these organizations‘ collective liability was calculated 
at over two trillion dollars.100 In the realm of environmental regula-
                                                                                                                                              
 93. Id. at 1143-44. 
 94. JONATHAN G.S. KOPPELL, THE POLITICS OF QUASI-GOVERNMENT: HYBRID 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL 1 (2003). I use the terms 
quasi-governmental and hybrid interchangeably.  
 95. Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1, 4. 
 96. Id. Of course, there are many criticisms of quasi-governmental organizations, as 
well, including the potential for a lack of public accountability. The advantages and limita-
tions of adopting this entity will be discussed in more detail infra Part IV.B.  
 97. Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 95, at 1-2, 9. 
 98. KOPPELL, supra note 94, at 2. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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tion, ―cooperative environmental decision-making processes exist at 
all levels of government—irrespective of community and/or ecosystem 
size—and in various private and quasi-governmental organization 
guises. Some of these processes are largely defined by geographic set-
ting, others by resource use and/or protection, and still others by 
statutory authorization or requirement.‖101  
 One might reasonably ask: Where does the authority for hybrid 
organizations come from? Are these organizations even constitution-
al? The answer is ambiguous, much in the same way that the answer 
regarding the constitutionality of the modern administrative state 
remains unsettled. Article I, Section 8, clause 18 of the U.S. Constitu-
tion is known as the ―Necessary and Proper Clause.‖ It states that 
―Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Pow-
ers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Govern-
ment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer there-
of.‖102 Since the country‘s early history, this clause was interpreted to 
justify the creation of administrative agencies that aid Congress and 
the President in the execution of Congress‘s statutory regimes and 
policy goals.103 This malleable provision has also been the justifica-
tion for Congress‘s experimentation with hybrid entities, which have 
expanded as the administrative state has expanded and the need for 
flexibility has increased.104  
 There are proponents and critics of hybrid organizations, and each 
side offers logical and valid opinions. Likewise, there are groups on 
both sides of the debate concerning whether the Army Corps should 
retain or cede jurisdiction over water releases from Lake Okeechobee. 
Currently, the Lake Okeechobee Basin is already operating in a sys-
tem that is largely cooperative. The goal of this Note is to shift the 
balance of power among the various actors so as to reach a more effi-
cient and effective result. This shift is two-fold: it calls for an incre-
mental increase in the amount of non-federal regulatory authority, 
plus a shift from state government to quasi-government. The re-
mainder of this Part discusses several reasons for and against this 
shift, and it describes the quasi-governmental organization‘s poten-
tial to leverage a greater amount of expertise, access to private capi-
tal, and superior flexibility and responsiveness. It also builds a case 
that responds to two critiques—democratic accountability and the 
possibility of capture.  
                                                                                                                                              
 101. Peter M. Lavigne, The Movement for American Ecosystem Restoration and Interac-
tive Environmental Decisionmaking: Quagmire, Diversion, or Our Last, Best Hope?, 17 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2003).  
 102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 103. KOPPELL, supra note 94, at 5. 
 104. See id. at 5-6. 
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B.   Point/Counterpoint: Army Corps Versus FDEP Versus 
Quasi-Governmental Organization 
 There are many reasons why those who feel negative impacts lo-
cally may be opposed to a distant and disinterested federal agency 
(or, at least, that is how some perceive federal agencies) making im-
portant decisions for which it does not suffer the consequences. On 
the other hand, there are valid reasons for maintaining the status 
quo, which include institutional knowledge gained from decades of 
regulation, the monetary resources of the federal government, and 
the clarity in having one agency make this decision.  
 First, there is some credence to the argument that the Army 
Corps has superior institutional knowledge. The agency has been 
regulating water releases and maintaining the Herbert Hoover Dike 
for decades, and it knows how to do the job. The agency knows how to 
calculate and interpret the data on weather patterns, water levels, 
and other factors affecting the water body, and it has technology in 
place to monitor lake conditions on a constant basis.105 However, as 
mentioned above, the SFWMD also provides important data, both for 
itself and for the Army Corps.106 The Army Corps has also ceded con-
trol over the complex web of physical infrastructure that it built 
throughout South Florida to the SFWMD, and the latter is success-
fully managing ―approximately 2,100 miles of canals and 2,000 miles 
of levees/berms, 70 pump stations and more than 600 water control 
structures and 625 project culverts‖ for more than eight million peo-
ple.107 Thus, it appears that the SFWMD has institutional knowledge 
and capacity similar to the Army Corps in this area. As Robert Perci-
val points out, part of the reason that the federal government began 
preempting the states in the realm of environmental law was because 
the states had failed to implement their own laws and policies, even 
after prodding from Congress. 108  While this was certainly true in 
many respects fifty years ago, state and local governments have since 
modernized and expanded, and many have gained expertise and 
competence in regulating environmental issues themselves.109 This is 
especially true for water law; around forty states implement the fed-
eral NPDES permitting program, and all fifty states oversee the cre-
                                                                                                                                              
 105. See SAJ Water Management Daily Reports, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG‘RS, 
http://w3.saj.usace.army.mil/h2o/reports.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2015). 
 106. See Operational Planning, supra note 75. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Percival, supra note 92, at 1147. 
 109. The rise of state expertise and competence in regulating aspects of the environ-
ment is partially, if not mostly, due to cooperative federalism provisions in which Congress 
encouraged the states to take action by offering monetary incentives, allowed them to take 
over federal statutory schemes after receiving the necessary approval, or required states to 
implement programs at the state and local level. See id. at 1173-75. 
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ation and implementation of state water quality standards.110 There 
can be no doubt that the federal government has the power to regu-
late navigable waters under the Commerce Clause and the federal 
navigational servitude,111 but it does not necessarily follow that the 
federal government must or should act on that power if important fed-
eral interests are not at stake and other sub-federal entities have suf-
ficient capacity to regulate.  
 The hybrid organization that this Note proposes would enhance, 
rather than hinder, the expertise required to properly manage the 
dike and water releases from the lake. It would require members of 
the Army Corps and the SFWMD who possess this important 
knowledge and skill set to be part of the governing board, thus ren-
dering transaction costs in transferring the information negligible.112 
Also, outside experts from industry and non-governmental organiza-
tions—such as engineers, hydrologists, and biologists—would be part 
of the commission, which only adds to the level and diversity of ex-
pertise. These individuals would be able to provide and analyze data 
that the Army Corps currently does not in order to reach a more 
complete understanding of the dike‘s capabilities and the ability of 
the estuaries to withstand such releases. When dealing with a water-
shed as complicated as this one, it is important to have input and 
analysis from many sectors. The Florida Senate Select Committee 
criticized the Army Corps for recently failing to consider the ecologi-
cal effects of its actions,113 and the hybrid organization would address 
this valid concern. 
 The next argument for maintaining the status quo stems from the 
federal government‘s vast monetary resources. The idea here is that 
the federal government has more funds available to it than state gov-
ernments, and federal funding is usually necessary to fully imple-
ment an environmental program. 114  There is evidence that state 
                                                                                                                                              
 110. See id. at 1174-75. 
 111. The federal navigation servitude is always lurking beneath the depths of every 
navigable water—or water with the potential for navigability—of the United States. It 
―effectively insulates the federal government from otherwise legitimate takings claims 
where federal projects or operation of federal regulatory authority in navigable waters 
impair private property rights in those waters.‖ ADLER, CRAIG & HALL, supra note 37, at 
299-300. 
 112. Indeed, the SFWMD and the Army Corps have already worked extensively togeth-
er in conducting studies of the issue, and the SFWMD has published its own final adaptive 
protocols concerning Lake Okeechobee operations, which are ―intended to provide opera-
tional guidance to the‖ water management district‘s staff and Governing Board. See 
SFWMD FINAL ADAPTIVE PROTOCOLS, supra note 24, at iii-v.  
 113. See SENATE COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 10 (―[M]inimizing the risk 
of dike failure to ensure public safety is the primary concern when lake levels increase. 
This concern trumps all other considerations, including environmental harm.‖); see also id. 
at 12 (―The Corps has been criticized over the past decade . . . for its disregard for the envi-
ronmental damage some water resource projects have caused.‖). 
 114. Percival, supra note 92, at 1175. 
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budget cuts, combined with a reduction in federal financial assis-
tance and a failure of state governments to replace these lost funds 
with state funds, leads to state regulatory programs that fail to meet 
federally required environmental standards.115 When considering the 
Lake Okeechobee Basin, it is true that the Army Corps has 
the potential for far more funding than the State of Florida could 
provide. However, the fact remains that Congress must first appro-
priate funds to the agency, and the President must then allocate 
funds to this project in particular. In the past, the federal govern-
ment has failed to allocate the funds necessary to fix the Herbert 
Hoover Dike and build other infrastructure that would help reduce 
the flow of water into the estuaries, such as water reservoirs.116 In-
deed, Congress‘s failure to provide funding for additional water res-
ervoirs is one of the main criticisms the State of Florida has against 
Congress and the Army Corps.117 The Florida Legislature has pledged 
to split the financial burden of construction with the federal govern-
ment,118 and Governor Scott claims that Congress has not been living 
up to its end of the bargain.119 While the federal government‘s knee-
jerk reaction might be to reject any proposal that limits its power, 
Congress and the Army Corps should soon realize that this reduces 
the burden on an overworked agency with a limited budget.120 
                                                                                                                                              
 115. Id. 
 116. See SENATE COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 12 (summarizing a 2012 
study that ―found that the Corps faces an unsustainable situation driven by budgetary 
considerations‖ and that if current funding levels from Congress remain, ―degraded per-
formance‖ will occur).  
 117. See id. at 15; Alvarez, supra note 1. 
 118. In its 2014 budget, the Florida Legislature appropriated 231 million dollars in 
funding for the Indian River Lagoon and Lake Okeechobee Basin projects—including fund-
ing for additional water reservoirs and a series of southward bridges to allow some water to 
flow naturally into the Everglades again—by not only approving the Senate Select Com-
mittee‘s monetary recommendations, but exceeding them. See Press Release, Fla. Senate, 
Senator Negron Announces Full Funding of Lagoon Recommendations (Apr. 28, 2014), 
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/Media/PressReleases/Show/1785. 
 119. See Alvarez, supra note 1.  
 120. The President‘s budget for the Army Corps for fiscal year 2014 was released on 
March 3, 2014. In total, the budget includes roughly 4.5 billion dollars in gross discretion-
ary spending for civil works projects. However, the President only allocated 75 million dol-
lars to Herbert Hoover Dike seepage control and 66 million dollars to the more-general South 
Florida Everglades Restoration Program. See News Release No. 14-002, U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng‘rs, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Releases Work Plans for Fiscal Year 2014 Civil Works 
Appropriations (Mar. 4, 2014), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Media/NewsReleases/ 
NewsReleaseArticleView/tabid/231/Article/475460/us-army-corps-of-engineers-releases-work-
plans-for-fiscal-year-2014-civil-works.aspx. Based on the Army Corps‘ own figures, the cost 
of repairing and stabilizing the dike is around two billion dollars, and the agency has al-
ready spent 400 million dollars on repairs since 2007. SELECT COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 6, at 8-9. Considering that the repairs are supposed to be completed by 2018, it 
can be inferred that appropriating 75 million dollars to control dike seepage for fiscal year 
2014 falls far short of the annual amount of money required to work expeditiously to secure 
the dike. See id. In addition, the Select Committee‘s report highlights many recent Army 
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 The current state of affairs, therefore, does not necessarily tip the 
scales in favor of reserving jurisdiction in the Army Corps, but it also 
does not necessarily imply that the state government is preferable. 
Jonathan Koppell notes that this is where quasi-governmental organ-
izations have frequently found their functional justification.121 Hybrid 
organizations may be funded by both public and private funds, or 
they may even be fully privatized.122 This Note‘s proposal would call 
for a combination of public and private funding to best meet the large 
fiscal demand necessitated by dike repairs and other operations. This 
would ensure that the federal and state governments would still have 
incentives to oversee that the hybrid organization is properly manag-
ing its funds, but it also allows the inclusion of desperately needed 
private capital to make up the continuous public funding shortfall.123 
It also provides a buffer against changing political tides, as future 
politicians who come into power may decide that the health of Lake 
Okeechobee and the St. Lucie and Caloosahatchee estuaries are low 
on their list of priorities. 
 Also, there is a third argument that having one agency—the Army 
Corps—control the dike and the decision over water releases actually 
supports simplicity, clarity, and efficiency through structural norms 
and accountability.124 In a similar fashion, this would be the argu-
ment made in support of the transfer of jurisdiction to the FDEP ra-
ther than a quasi-governmental organization, as jurisdiction would 
still remain in a single governmental body within an established hi-
erarchical structure. There may be fears that a hybrid organization 
would lead to inefficiency and deadlock based on its composition by 
persons with varying and opposing interests.125 However, the reality 
of the situation is that jurisdiction in the Lake Okeechobee Basin is 
already split among various actors. The entire watershed is managed 
in a cooperative manner between federal, state, and local govern-
                                                                                                                                              
Corps civil works failures and seeming lack of concern for environmental damage caused 
by its authorization of projects. See id. at 12. 
 121. KOPPELL, supra note 94, at 6 (―Budget constraints and rules have always been a 
significant factor in the explanation for the growth of American quasi-government.‖). 
 122. See generally KEVIN R. KOSAR, THE QUASI GOVERNMENT: HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS 
WITH BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS (2011), available 
at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30533.pdf (describing the various types of quasi-
governmental organizations at the federal level). 
 123. KOPPELL, supra note 94, at 3. 
 124. See KOSAR, supra note 122, at 31 (describing ―[a] unified executive structure, cou-
pled with hierarchical lines of authority and accountability‖). But see id. at 32 (―Those fa-
voring the public law approach to management . . . believe that the democratic value of 
political accountability should take precedence over the managerial value of maximizing 
efficiency and outcomes.‖). 
 125. See Meghan Gruebner, Note, Delaware’s Answer to Management Deadlock in the 
Limited Liability Company: Judicial Dissolution, 32 J. CORP. L. 641, 649-52 (2007) (de-
scribing deadlock in the private partnership context). 
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ments, and the federal government has already ceded control to the 
FDEP (which then delegated authority to the SFWMD) to manage 
the extremely important infrastructure that the Army Corps itself 
had built. Thus, the argument that jurisdiction over the Herbert 
Hoover Dike and the water releases into the estuaries must rest 
within the sole discretion of the Army Corps is without much merit. 
Nevertheless, this is also precisely the reason why this author does 
not agree with Senator Negron‘s proposal to transfer jurisdiction to 
the FDEP. While the FDEP‘s expert knowledge about the environ-
mental issues occurring within the state are to be desired, the fact 
remains that this would allow one entity to control water releases 
without any input from other entities—essentially what is happening 
now with the Army Corps, just at the state level. This is contrary to 
the ultimate goal of managing the Basin cooperatively, effectively, 
and efficiently.  
 Proponents of hybrid organizations argue that including various 
interested parties in the decision-making process from all levels of 
government and the private sector is preferable and actually more 
efficient and meaningful than overlapping, ambiguous jurisdictional 
boundaries.126 While it may seem counterintuitive, several sectors can 
be involved while also increasing flexibility and responsiveness.127 This 
is because this type of organization requires cooperation between hori-
zontal actors who all have the ability to influence outcomes.128 Also, the 
hybrid organization‘s foundational procedures would be structured in 
such a way that deadlock would be made very difficult.129 The fears of 
those who criticize hybrid organizations out of concern that clashing 
opinions will lead to deadlock are thus likely overstated.  
 It is also important to think about the precedent that such a 
transfer of jurisdiction might set. Depending on one‘s views, this 
could be a good or bad thing. For those who prefer power to be cen-
tralized in the federal government, the transfer of control over the 
Herbert Hooker Dike and Lake Okeechobee‘s water releases might be 
seen as the beginning of a slippery slope. Their argument would be 
that by allowing a quasi-governmental entity to gain control over ac-
tions that have historically been within the sole purview of the feder-
al government, this would open the door for other states that are also 
                                                                                                                                              
 126. Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 95, at 10-12. 
 127. KOSAR, supra note 122, at 31-32. 
 128. See id. at 10. 
 129. See id. at 11 (―Recent scholarship on new governance informs [the authors‘] as-
sessment of how hybrid structures can be designed to include stakeholders effectively and 
appropriately. New governance views regulation not as solely top-down, public control by 
state and federal agencies with central authority, but rather as an ongoing and ever-
changing relationship—often one of negotiation and compromise—between agencies, regu-
lated entities, and other stakeholders.‖).  
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dissatisfied with the Army Corps‘ regulatory decision-making. To be 
sure, the Army Corps does not have a perfect track record; the agency 
―has been criticized over the past decade for underperforming or fail-
ing civil works projects‖ and has been accused of displaying a lack of 
concern for negative environmental impacts caused by its projects.130 
Also, the slippery slope argument only matters if, as a substantive 
matter, reserving jurisdiction in the Army Corps is the desirable al-
ternative. For others, the hybrid organization would be a welcome 
solution to a federal agency that has arguably failed in its duty to 
properly manage this water system,131 as well as a Congress that 
appears apathetic and repeatedly fails to appropriate sufficient 
funds to build additional infrastructure and thus prevent further 
environmental degradation.132  
 There also exists a notable policy reason for ceding control to a 
sub-federal governmental entity, which is based on the argument 
that state and local governments should be able to manage their own 
resources as they see fit.133 The idea here is that the federal govern-
ment is detached and removed from the reality of various situations 
and differences on the ground, and a federal agency‘s decisions are 
sometimes contrary to those that state or local governments think 
are best.134 Of course, there are good reasons for having federal con-
trol in many instances, including the ―guarantee [of] a minimum lev-
el of environmental protection to citizens regardless of their place of 
residence‖ and the prevention of states engaging in competition that 
                                                                                                                                              
 130. SELECT COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 11-12. 
 131. The Army Corps recently completed a five-year project in which the most vulnera-
ble portion of the dike was repaired, but there are many more repairs that need to be done. 
See Alvarez, supra note 1; Reid, supra note 4. Furthermore, the Army Corps has invested 
400 million dollars since 2007 to make improvements to the dike, see SELECT COMMITTEE 
FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 8-9, and that it will continue to work diligently with ―a 
team of engineers, hydrologists, geologists, scientists, contract and real estate specialists, 
budget analysts, and many others . . . to ensure the very best rehabilitation strategies are 
applied to the dike today and in the future.‖ U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG‘RS, JACKSONVILLE 
DIST., HERBERT HOOVER DIKE REHABILITATION: PROJECT UPDATE (Spring 2013), available 
at http://www.saj.usace.army.mil/Portals/44/docs/FactSheets/HHD_FS_Rehab_Spring2013_ 
508.pdf. Nevertheless, the dike remains one of the most vulnerable in the country, and this 
increased risk of failure drives the Army Corps‘ decisions to release polluted water into the 
estuaries. See Alvarez, supra note 1; Reid, supra note 4. State and local officials emphasize 
that the area is one tropical storm away from a potentially catastrophic disaster. Alvarez, 
supra note 1. 
 132. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 133. Percival, supra note 92, at 1144 (―State and local governments argue that federal 
regulations infringe on their autonomy and sovereignty, and that they impose costly un-
funded mandates states can ill afford. Even though Congress has taken care to ensure that 
federal environmental law rarely preempts state standards, states argue that they should 
be given more freedom and flexibility to develop environmental standards tailored to local 
circumstances.‖). 
 134. Id. 
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creates a race to the bottom.135 This would not be the case here, how-
ever, as the problem does not affect interstate pollution and involves 
no competition among states; rather, this involves the transfer of 
control of a single water body to some type of sub-federal entity (here, 
a hybrid organization) that is capable of managing it.  
C.   Criticisms of the Hybrid Model 
 Every idea has its drawbacks and weak points, and the quasi-
governmental organization is no exception. Two criticisms of this 
model are worth mentioning: democratic accountability and the pos-
sibility of capture. 
 Fundamentally, democratic accountability is based on the idea 
that elected government officials can be held accountable for their 
actions by the citizenry.136 When a politician makes a mistake or a 
decision with which her constituents disagree, she may be voted out 
of office. Concerns over democratic accountability regarding the tra-
ditional administrative state have been discussed in great depth,137 
but the issue with quasi-governmental organizations is that they go 
one step further than traditional administrative agencies; they are 
even more attenuated and protected from the potentially negative 
effects of the electorate.138 Critics of the hybrid form ask: What if the 
committee makes a mistake or an unpopular decision? To whom 
would the committee be held accountable? These are not easy ques-
tions, and the answer remains ambiguous. However, the beauty of 
the quasi-governmental organization is in its flexibility—depending 
on its structure, a hybrid organization can be subject to more or less 
regulatory oversight and more or less accountability.139 In the case of 
the Lake Okeechobee Basin, this author believes that the committee 
should maintain a fair amount of independence in its management of 
the dike and water releases, in the same way that an agency‘s actions 
are entitled to deference and are only overturned if arbitrary, capri-
cious, or otherwise not in accordance with law.140 However, there still 
must be some governmental oversight, especially because the com-
mittee will be partially composed of governmental actors and public 
                                                                                                                                              
 135. Id. at 1171-72.  
 136. KOPPELL, supra note 94, at 3. 
 137. KOSAR, supra note 122, at 3-5. 
 138. See id.; see also KOPPELL, supra note 94, at 3-4. 
 139. KOSAR, supra note 122, at 2 (describing the relationship of hybrid organizations to 
Congress or the Executive Branch as ―a descending scale from closest to the most distant‖).  
 140. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). There is also the issue of sovereign immunity and 
whether hybrid organizations should be entitled to it. Because the organization would still 
receive substantial public funding and be partially compiled of representatives from differ-
ent levels of government, this author believes that the committee should be entitled to the 
protection of sovereign immunity.  
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funds will be utilized. The extent and type of oversight would need to 
be fleshed out in more detail, but at the least, an annual review of 
the quasi-governmental organization‘s actions and allocation of funds 
should be required. 
 The second critique to consider is that of the theory of the firm, 
and more specifically, the possibility of capture.141 Opponents may 
argue that because the hybrid organization would attract private 
funding and be partially composed of individuals from the private 
sector—both for profit and not for profit—the committee could be-
come captured by perverse, self-serving private interests.142 It could 
become profit-driven rather than goal-driven. However, the hybrid 
organization would be created as a nonprofit entity, thus largely 
eliminating this threat.143 There are several additional buffers that 
would help prevent this from occurring, as well, including the exist-
ence of public-sector board members, maintenance of some level of 
regulatory oversight by the federal government, and the ability to 
remove individuals from the governing board. 
 In sum, there are valid reasons for and against ceding jurisdiction 
to the FDEP or a quasi-governmental entity. The above discussion 
analyzes these issues and provides support for the transfer of juris-
diction to a hybrid organization rather than preserving the status 
quo in the Army Corps or transferring jurisdiction to the FDEP. In 
the next Part, this Note fleshes out how this organization could be 
composed. 
V.   THE QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE OF 
THE LAKE OKEECHOBEE BASIN 
 A quasi-governmental committee composed of various interested 
parties at the federal, state, and local levels—public and private—
should be created to oversee the regulation of Lake Okeechobee water 
releases and the related infrastructure, including the Herbert Hoover 
Dike. This entity would represent the collective decisions of a group 
of people, each representing different interests, who are able to ana-
lyze and discuss a situation before taking action. The interests of one 
party would weigh against the interests of a different party, and ide-
ally, these parties would discuss the various alternatives and reach a 
consensus. It may very well be the case that the committee, if pre-
sented with a similar situation to the one the Army Corps faced last 
summer, would make the same decision in light of public health and 
                                                                                                                                              
 141. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 95, at 63. 
 142. See id. (―Public-private hybrids must always be alert to concerns about indus-
try capture.‖). 
 143. Of course, this does not entirely address the threat of capture in quasi-
governmental organizations that are for-profit, but that problem is not at issue here. 
310  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:285 
 
safety concerns.144 Yet, rather than have different entities continue to 
point fingers at one another for any mistakes or shortcomings, this 
entity would take responsibility as a collective group.  
 Quasi-governmental organizations are vast and varied, and each 
entity‘s structure is unique. 145  Nevertheless, rough classifications 
have been created that sufficiently encompass many of the organiza-
tions at the federal level.146 The type of organization that would best 
suit the needs of Lake Okeechobee and the estuaries is similar to an 
entity classified as a nonprofit ―organization independent of, but de-
pendent upon, an agency of the federal government.‖147 These organi-
zations are mission-oriented148 rather than profit-driven, and they 
exist in large part because of the flexibility and necessity of funding 
from both public and private sources.149 Nonprofits can maintain sur-
plus funds and invest them into the organization‘s future plans; they 
simply cannot be used to benefit the governing board or owners.150 
This would work well for the Herbert Hoover Dike; if the organiza-
tion were to become profit-driven, the committee would likely appear 
too privatized and its governing board self-serving. The question of 
whether Army Corps and/or SFWMD employees would continue to 
work on the physical infrastructure or whether the committee could 
hire workers from private construction and engineering firms to 
complete some of the work would need to be decided, but this is not a 
sticking point.  
 The proposed committee would be composed of eleven individuals, 
and it would include two representatives each from the Army Corps, 
FDEP, and SFWMD, and one representative each from local govern-
ment, an environmental nonprofit, the agricultural industry, the fish-
ing/tourism industry, and a private engineering firm.151 Each gov-
                                                                                                                                              
 144. See SFWMD FINAL ADAPTIVE PROTOCOLS, supra note 24, at iv (The 2008 Lake 
Okeechobee Regulation Schedule ―made . . . clear that the issue of public health and safety 
regarding the integrity of the Herbert Hoover Dike was the dominant factor in the decision 
making process to select a preferred alternative regulation schedule.‖).  
 145. KOPPELL, supra note 94, at 2. 
 146. KOSAR, supra note 122, at 2-3.  
 147. Id. at 16. 
 148. Koppell notes that there are four types of principal preferences, which can be clas-
sified as (1) positive, mission; (2) negative, mission; (3) positive, non-mission; and (4) nega-
tive, non-mission. KOPPELL, supra note 94, at 71-75. He finds that negative, non-mission 
preferences are most likely to be satisfied, while positive, mission preferences are least 
likely. Id. at 75. This makes intuitive sense, though, as it is easier not to do something 
inconsequential than it is to actively do something important, as the latter requires much 
more work. The Lake Okeechobee Basin Committee would be fulfilling a positive, mission-
based preference; it should be evident that the task will not be easy. 
 149. KOSAR, supra note 122, at 16-17. 
 150. Definition of ‘Not For Profit,’ INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/ 
not-for-profit.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2015).  
 151. It is important to note that this is only a proposal, and the composition of the gov-
erning committee could obviously be tweaked.  
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ernmental entity would choose its own representatives. Once chosen, 
the public-sector representatives would choose the private-sector rep-
resentatives. This would help to preserve government accountability, 
which distinguishes this committee from a traditional nonprofit or-
ganization independent of, but dependent upon, the government.152 
Also, the enabling statute would provide more detailed procedures for 
selection, term limits, and removal.  
 The committee could meet weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly, which 
should not be difficult given the widespread use of teleconferencing. 
In addition, the group should create a set of rules and regulations 
beyond those specified in the enabling statute to aid in self-
governance and coordination of activities. This could be done by uti-
lizing notice and comment rulemaking in order to ensure that the 
public has a voice.153 In times of disagreement or stalemate, there 
should be a process by which a tie is broken, and, potentially, a pro-
cess for vetoing a decision. In times of urgency—for example, when 
the committee must make an immediate decision about whether to 
release water into the estuaries due to rising lake water levels—
there should be a plan in place to convene the group immediately (re-
quiring a certain number of participating members to form a quor-
um) and to quickly make decisions based on scenarios and outcomes 
already calculated and anticipated by the group.154 There should also 
be a method by which the governing board may seek assistance from 
the federal or state government in times of emergency, such as when 
a tropical storm or hurricane hits.  
 Ideally, if this experiment proves to be successful, the concept of 
hybrid organizations in this area of regulation may take hold else-
where. Other states may seek to petition Congress for transfers of 
jurisdiction to newly created entities that could manage and oversee 
each particular state‘s expensive, contentious, and important water 
resources and infrastructure. Further down the road, Congress may 
feel comfortable creating a provision of the CWA that outlines a pro-
cedure for the creation of hybrid organizations to oversee ―state wa-
ters of significant concern,‖ much in the same way section 402 of the 
                                                                                                                                              
 152. See KOSAR, supra note 122, at 16-17. One criticism of these organizations is that 
they need more regulatory oversight and accountability regarding management of funds. 
Id. As discussed above, the federal government would be able to review all of the commit-
tee‘s spending annually, which should eliminate this concern. 
 153. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).  
 154. The Army Corps already makes decisions now ―based on a set of quantitative per-
formance measures of ecosystem and water supply conditions that have a strong founda-
tion in population ecology, regional environmental science, and water resources engineer-
ing.‖ SFWMD FINAL ADAPTIVE PROTOCOLS, supra note 24, at iv-v. Thus, it should not prove 
difficult to transfer and utilize these measures, or to create updated measures, once the 
quasi-governmental committee is formed.  
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CWA outlines the procedure for transferring jurisdiction over the 
NPDES permitting program from the EPA to the states. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 This Note‘s goal is to propose the best—not the perfect—
regulatory solution to this very real and urgent problem. The Lake 
Okeechobee Basin and the St. Lucie and Caloosahatchee estuaries 
require action now, and Congress continues to withhold the funds 
necessary to properly repair the Herbert Hoover Dike and build addi-
tional water reservoirs. The Army Corps is also delayed in its sched-
ule of repairs. Florida has allocated 230 million dollars to Basin pro-
jects in 2014, but it simply does not have enough money in its coffers 
to cover the entire cost—and why should it, when the state does not 
have control over the infrastructure and plays no role in the decision-
making process regarding water releases? The time has come, then, 
to think critically and innovatively about the best solution moving 
forward, which is to create a quasi-governmental committee to man-
age the Herbert Hoover Dike and water releases from Lake Okeecho-
bee into the St. Lucie and Caloosahatchee estuaries. This proposal 
seeks to address the critical needs of the estuaries while balancing 
jurisdiction among various interested parties with limited govern-
mental oversight. It would allow the committee to seek funding from 
private capital and would aid in management flexibility and efficiency. 
